Showing posts with label personal identity. Show all posts
Showing posts with label personal identity. Show all posts

Thursday, 8 November 2012

Abandoning the Essential, Embracing the Vague

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Ideas of the self continue to bewilder. Philosophy, so often disengaged with the real word, becomes starkly relevant when we consider, for example, the daily tribulations of dementia sufferers and carers, and their very real concerns about identity.

Julian Baggini's The Ego Trick contains a very nice summary of one apparent problem facing notions of the self, 

“Therein lies a paradox of any view of the self which puts psychological continuity at its core. On such views,radical discontinuity destroys it. But if there is no hardcore of self, and it is always in flux, then as long as the change is gradual, two very different stages in a person's life can legitimately be seen as stages in the life of one self.” (pg.56)

To paraphrase wikipedia, a paradox is a statement that leads to a contradiction or a situation which defies logic or reason. Baggini rightly highlights the importance of the “paradox” which arises from a common notion of the self. However, I think the solution is to realise it is no true paradox as such. There is in fact nothing contradictory about holding that the self survives across long term change, whilst also holding that it cannot survive certain rapid and/or sufficient kinds of change. This is is possible when we abandon essentialist criteria, the idea that there is a fundamental core or “pearl” of the self to be discovered, rather than a composite entity arising from memory and cognition. Instead, the self becomes vague; a complex phenomena resulting from our biologically circumstantial cognitive apparatus and our relationship with others. Whereas the essentialist view leads us to believe there must be definite conditions when the self remains the same or not, the alternative frees us to the see the self as far more confusing.

In everyday life it's always clear that the person we saw yesterday is still the same person today. And yet it is not hard to conjure situations where it seems clear they are not. In between there are fuzzy grey areas, fuzzy and grey not because we don't understand the truth about the self not because we lack the understanding about the essential nature of the self, but because there is no truth about the matter, there is no essential nature of the self.

Traditional views of an essential self include the idea of the soul, prevalent at least in West, and enduring.

Much of what determines our feelings of a continuous, pervasive self in ourselves and others, must surely be the result of useful adaption. Even species with a simple social life have the need to track and distinguish other particular members as continuous entities, despite physical and behavioural changes over time. Within astonishingly elaborate human society this basic remains true, but is compounded with myriad complexities that come with higher awareness and profound relationships. This complexity creates uncertainty and confusion, strengthened by our own intuitions that there must be an essential part of ourselves which, once understood, will enlighten us to the mysteries of the self. Our evolved psychology may well predispose us to viewing the person as having an essential core. But by clinging to this idea within philosophy we become confused. This intuition may well be a useful adaption, but it does not follow that it reveals anything metaphysically true.

The Sorities Paradox. Abandoning essentialist criteria and embracing vagueness may cast light on apparent contradictions.


Of course there is nothing wrong with calling the apparent discontinuity of conclusions about the self a paradox, or to be continually puzzled by it. That is an inevitable part of the nebulous self and the human condition. Anyone who has experienced the development of dementia within a loved one (an issue Baggini discusses at length) will understand the conflicted feelings one can feel about the identity of the sufferer.

Is the dementia sufferer the same person they once were? Within the delicate scenarios this question may be raised there may be well founded and pragmatic reasons for assuming one or the other, the reasonableness of which will be relative to the stage and context of the sufferer's illness. Sometimes it may be clear that our loved one is the same person they always were. Changed perhaps. But still them. Unfortunately it is not always so clear. Sometimes it will be hard to say. Every carer has a different perspective, seldom are any of them wrong. That is just the peculiar, sometimes painful nature of the self.

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Baggini, J (2011) The Ego Trick Granta Publications: London

Saturday, 18 August 2012

A sign of the times?

(by Jonny)

I work on a shop floor. In between the inevitable chores any quality retail outfit would demand, is the less inevitable philosophical discourse that frequently arises between staff. Yesterday the topic of the day was personal identity. What I particularly enjoyed about the discussion was the surprising, for me anyway, acceptability of what I thought was a non-conventional view of the self. Not that everyone was in precise agreement, but what was in consensus was a rejection of the “traditional view” of there existing a distinct and fundamental self which essentially constitutes “us”, which is independent of the complex interaction of varied biological processes and is ultimately, if not always completely, at the helm of the gross body. The rejection of this view in favour of an idea that self is far more fragile, far more contingent, and without constituting a single central executive, was a pleasant discovery.

It reminded me of a class a couple of years ago when my lecturer polled the class asking whether they would willingly enter Nozick's famous experience machine (in short, a machine capable of producing in the subject an artificial life consisting of whatever desirable or pleasurable experiences she should want). When a little over the half said they would be willing to enter the machine he responded, unfazed, that this was a consistent trend among contemporary undergraduates that contradicted the results of polls taken in the 70s when the thought experiment was first introduced in “Anarchy State and Utopia” (1974). Though I'm a fan of thought experiments (usually because they sound like cool ideas for scifi stories), it does make you question the value of generalised results . In this case, initial results may not be the refutation of a certain utilitarianism some might like to think it is. 

My experience machine life would basically look like a prog rock cover
In any case these discussions continue to prove that philosophical dialogue is as popular as it ever was and will continue to be, and further that we should be cautious to infer intuitions or make sweeping conclusions about societies' predominant convictions.

Nozick, Robert (1974). Anarchy, State, and Utopia. New York: Basic Books