Meaning is User Relative

The dominant paradigm in cognitive science and philosophy of mind is the computational theory of mind (CTM). In its simplest form this theory states that the mind is essentially a device that takes inputs, performs a series of operations on them, and gives us an output. This process is known as a computation, and it is also what the digital computer sitting in front of you does. This is obviously no coincidence, as CTM and computer science have developed alongside one another since the 1950s.

Cue hackneyed image of 'mind as computer'

One major criticism of CTM is that it seems unable to account for meaning or semantic content. Any given computational process can be fully described in terms of the symbols that it operates on, the syntax, along with the rules that govern those operations. Whilst we do bestow meaning on to the symbols that our digital computers operate on, that meaning appears to be entirely relative to us, the user. It does not appear to be inherent to the symbols themselves, and in fact there is an infinite range of interpretations that can be given to any set of symbols (Pylysyhn 1986: 40). The worry is that if the mind is a computer, there would be no (inherent) semantic content to our thoughts.

This might turn out to be correct, which would mean that our mental states only mean anything relative to an observer. My mental representation of the blue sky outside of my window might be interpreted entirely differently by an alien scientist scanning my brain. To it, that mental state might simply represent a complex calculation, or a nostalgic yearning for the Sirius system. This, in fact, is a major plot point in The Hitchhiker's Guide to the Galaxy, where (SPOILER ALERT) the Earth turns out to be a giant supercomputer designed to calculate the Ultimate Question of Life, The Universe and Everything - the answer to which I will not reveal to you at this time.

This was the first attempt.

So what about my own interpretation of that mental state as representing a blue sky? That would have to be relative to me, as the 'user' of my own mental computer. What exactly this means, or if it even makes sense to say that I could be interpreting my own mental states, gets very complicated, very quickly. Aside from anything else, it raises questions about the nature of consciousness and the self, both of which are extremely contentious topics. Still, I see nothing wrong with saying that semantic content might be entirely user-relative, both in the case of the digital computer and that of the brain-bound one.


References

• Adams, D. 1979. The Hithchhiker's Guide to the Galaxy. Pan Books.
• Pylyshyn, Z. 1986. Computation and Cognition. MIT Press.

More Ranting on Relativism: Chemero on Clark's “Being There”

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(by Jonny)

A couple of weeks ago I posted about a problem that occasionally surfaces in philosophy of cognition, particularly embodied cognition. It's the problem of relativism. It's a problem, in my eyes, because it's an unnecessary obstacle for certain very intuitive ideas to become acceptable to many people, it's a distraction. Though the notion an organism's experience of the world is necessarily dependent on contingent sensorimotor capacities is highly plausible, though the notion that the way the world is largely relative to our particular bodily form, and that form's contingent interaction with the world makes some immediate sense, relativism is off-puttingly problematic.

Well I recently came across an example of this sort of view in the form of Chemero's (1998) review of Andy Clark's “Being There” (1997). Chemero, who otherwise positively recommends Clark's embodied conclusions, complains of the author's unwillingness to accept that his thesis implies a rejection of “world-it-itself”, of “scientific realism”.

Andy Clark's "Being There"

The precise reason remains a mystery to me. Chemero seems sensible when he says,

“Since there is no central executive in mobots with connectionist brains, there will be no detailed, action-neutral representation of the world. In most cases, agents will use the world as its own model. ” (pg.3)

And it sensibly follows from the central ideas of embodied cognition that,

“we should expect creatures (including humans) to be sensitive only to those aspects of their environments that matter to the actions they regularly undertake... The world represented by animals with much different needs than humans will be much different than the world humans represent.” (pp.5-6)

But it does not seem to follow that there is no world “in and of itself” independent of our perceptions. One of the issues seems to be Chemero's notion of what realism exactly says. He writes that falsehood of we must reject “so-called "common-sense realism," in which the world-in-itself is thought to correspond to everyday human categories. ” But it is ambiguous what he means by everyday human categories. Perhaps, as I mentioned in my last post, we will have reject the idea that the world is conveniently structured as our thoughts are structured. The world as constituted by giraffes and cactus and melons is a contingent, human perception of the world based on human needs, but it does not imply that the existence of giraffes is entirely relative. There is still something about the giraffe that exists independent of an organism's contingent situation. So perhaps we will reject a certain everyday realism, a realism that takes the world to always conform to everyday human categories, but this is a weak realism.

Though Chemero is right to say that “physics and other sciences depend upon our language-using abilities” (pg.7), he is wrong to conclude that science does not tell us something, in some form, about the real independent properties of the universe. 

Embodied cognition does not entail, and should not imply, this sort of radical relativism.

How I feel when I start thinking about cognitive science and relativism.

Chemero, A (1998) A Stroll Through the Worlds of Animals and Humans: Review of Being There: Putting Brain, Body and World Together Again by Andy Clark. Psyche, 4(14)

Clark, A (1997) Being There: Putting Brain, Body and World Together Again. MIT Press: Cambridge, Massachusetts

Minding the Abyss: World Building without radical relativism

(by Jonny)

In their influential book “The Embodied Mind” (1991) Francisco Varela, Evan Thompson and Eleanor Rosch made a pioneering journey through many of the themes that the contemporary field of embodied cognition continues to spend a great deal of its resources exploring. One theme that hasn’t caught on in the same way that, say its emphasis on ecological perception has, is the notion that there is no pre-existing world with a given set of properties, a rejection of the “realism” that pervades most contemporary “analytic philosophy”. They express a position which takes the idea of embodied action, that the way in which we make sense of the world is necessarily dependent on contingent sensorimotor capacities, to imply that a perceiver-dependent world is an incoherent notion. Instead, it is perceivers who build worlds out of their contingent physical circumstances. The authors contend that the thesis of embodied mind leads us to believe that are no properties out there in the world independent of perceivers, that there is no independent or objective world.

Clearly published in the 90s...

Varela et al seem to believe that embodied cognition must tell us something profound about the metaphysical nature of reality. Yet it seems to me that this belief is an unnecessary chasm-leap of logic, one which if taken too seriously threatens the much more mundane claims of this research project. The jump seems to be this: why does the fact that perception is dependent upon action (in turn dependent on a contingent physical apparatus) imply that the world has independent, given properties. Why does the fact that our own knowledge of the world depends on the our particular and happenstance bodily form, imply that the world does not exist prior to our particular and happenstance knowledge of it? Such radically relativist theories about the metaphysic of the world do not seem to me to follow.  Andy Clark nicely reflect the worry about relativism’s unnecessary influence.

This high tech diagram I just stole from the internet has little to do with what we're talking about and probably won't help. ( http://www.unc.edu/~megw/TheoriesofPerception.html ) 

“Varela et al. use their reflections as evidence against realist and objectivist views of the world. I deliberately avoid this extension, which runs the risk of obscuring the scientific value of an embodied, embedded approach by linking it to the problematic idea that objects are not independent of the mind. My claim, in contrast, is simply that the aspects of real-world structure which biological brains represent will often be tightly geared to specific needs and sensorimotor capacities” (1997: 173).

Andy Clark. Nuff said.

“Continental  philosophy”, which I contend at this point in the history of ideas has more time for more radically relativaist theories, has influenced and continues to influence embodied cognition in a tolerant and healthy way that should continue. Yet undoubtedly the majority of research within embodied cognition still takes place within the tradition of “analytic philosophy”, which itself assumes a common sense realism, and whilst it is always healthy to question our paradigms, I believe we would be too quick to throw away the ever prudent belief in an world independent of perception.

Nevertheless, I believe relativist theories do teach the traditional analytic approach important lessons- lessons I believe Varela et al touch upon but take too far. The way human agents carve up the world is heavily shaped by theoretical-framework/s; our relative cultural, historical and physical context. Richard Rorty seems right in some sense when he says the concept of “giraffe” is ultimately contingent (1999: xxvi). It seems to me perfectly plausible that some alien species would not perceive the world as containing giraffes. Giraffes (organisms and their categorization) happen to be a useful object for us to conceptualise for obvious evolutionary reasons. However, this does not mean that there is nothing independent of our cognitive systems, independent of our descriptions, independent of our history, which allows us to pick out giraffes. We can learn from Rorty that for example “our linguistic practices are so bound up with our other social practices that our descriptions of nature… will always be a function of our social needs” without needing to agree that there is no underlying “dough” from which to cut out cookies (1999: 48). We can likewise learn from Varela et al that our contingent physical makeup must determine the way in which we perceive the world without needing claim that there is no world beyond our perception. 

Andy Clark (1997) Being There: Putting Brain, Body and World Together

Again. MIT Press: Cambridge, Massachusetts

Rorty, R (1999) Philosophy and Social Hope Penguin: New York

Varela, F., Thompson, E. and Rosch, E. (1991). The embodied mind. MIT Press: Cambridge, Massachusetts