"To Squeak and To Squeak Well Are Two Different Things"

 I'm not very much fun at parties. In a recent discussion I overheard regarding a friend's pet guinea pig and their “speaking” to another, I didn't have the sense to ignore it, but decided to ruin a perfectly amiable encounter into a debate about animal communication in which everyone left feeling no more satisfied with life.

On a number of occasions, mostly amongst non-philosophers, I've noticed a common response to a denial of language amongst non-human animals is a dismissive “well how do you know!?”. In an accusatory tone, they question how you could possibly think yourself so arrogant as to make claims about the inner workings of a small furry yet impenetrably mysterious rodent. As a matter of fact I think there's a large consensus amongst most philosophers and scientists that the vast majority, and probably all, non-human animal species are incapable of something equivalent to language (there is of course disagreement about the communicative abilities of primates and some other species). It's worth emphasising to people what is really being said, or not said, when claiming animals "aren't really speaking”, but instead partaking in other, admittedly complex, often not well understood forms of communication. 

It's important to realise that when I say guinea pigs don't have language, I'm not implying...

1. Cartesian Certainty. I don't know for 100% per cent, bet your sweet bippy that guinea pigs don't have language. Neither am I certain lampshades don't have language. Neither am I certain guinea pigs aren't made of cheese. But this sort of Cartesian doubt is as relevant to the question of language capacity, or inner mental activity of any kind, as it is to whether you're all in my head, or the world is a computer-simulated reality run by exploitative machines. In other words, it isn't relevant at all. Not to ordinary daily discourse. Hyperbolic doubt has its place, but it's not really a convincing argument against a particular theory. I don't know guinea pigs aren't really communicating in language, not for certain. But I believe they don't, based on certain inferences given certain empirical data. 

Neither am I saying...

2. Guinea pigs are rubbish. I'm under the impression that a common underlying feeling amongst layfolk is that by claiming animals aren't really “talking” when communicating, I'm somehow being disrespectful.That by denying them language I'm not only arrogant, but attacking their worth. It's as if not being able to communicate with language morally equates animals closer to a packet of Wotsits than a human. One clearly doesn't necessarily imply the other. Of course even if I did think that lack of language ability carried important moral ramifications (and truth be told I do think there is something to that thought), that wouldn't constitute an argument against my initial premise. It's just an implication you don't like.

Mr Tiddles. Less talk, more fluff.

The ascription of communicative abilities within other species must be an empirical question, in so far as once we've sorted out (theoretically) what we're looking for, it's an empirical question as to whether we find them in other species. If it's not, ultimately, an empirical question, I fail to see how we avoid naval gazing ponderment about what Mr Tiddles is really communicating to Fluffy Features.

I think the same extends to broader issues of mental life. Consciousness is an obviously more complex topic than language, lacking anything close to agreement on how we should use the word. But I do think that once we are more clear about what we're talking about, if we ever get there, ascription of consciousness will become more and more an empirical issue.

An important caveat: It is of course entirely possible that our empirical questions cannot practically be answered because of limits to our methods, or because we never manage to coherently establish the theoretical framework. Whilst whether or not Mr Tiddles is communicating in language is an empirical matter, it could be the case that we have insufficient means to pursue the investigation- though in fact with language we have some well established criteria. It is for more plausibly an issue with consciousness and its related issues. It strikes me that it is for insufficiencies within the theoretical understanding, and disagreements over empirical ground world, that we have so much disagreement e.g. with ascription of theory of mind to non-humans.