(by Jonny)
What should we make of cases where rhesus monkeys will starve themselves for several days rather than receive food at the expense of electrocuting a fellow monkey? What do we make of a chimpanzee infant that consistently helps a human in reaching tasks without reward (Warneken and Tomasello, 2006)?
Frans de Waal is famous for asking, “What is the difference about the way we act that makes us, and not any other species, moral beings?” (1996:11). What indeed. In “Primates and Philosophers” (2006), de Waal furthers his case for the continuous evolution of, and homologous relationship between, primate and human morality. After reading this great little title I am keen to begin penning some of my own thoughts on the subject of the origin and possibilities of morality in non-human animals.
“Can we consider other non-human animals ‘moral beings’?”; “Is human altruistic behaviour just a novel form of pre-existing capacities we share with our near relatives or an entirely unique capacity?” My own answers to such questions are inevitably motivated by several key assumptions: that what we regard as human moral behaviour is a natural development; that humans possess at least many of their social behaviours as the result of a continuous evolution from earlier social primates; that language in humans grants unique capacities for conceptualising, reasoning and self-awareness. Where do these assumptions lead me to in this debate?
The work of de Waal centres on the argument that we discover the foundations and aspects of our own morality in non-human primates and other animals. When we look at primates and discover their strategies for conflict resolution, cooperation, inequity aversion, and food-sharing, we discover much of what is important about human moral behaviour. This seemingly moral behaviour can become quite advanced.
Importantly for de Waal, humans are not selfish creatures hiding behind a veneer of fabricated rules for mutual benefit. There was never a time when humans were not cooperative, other concerning social creatures. We are inherently social, “moral beings” whose complex moral lives are nevertheless based on more primitive social capacities. There are no non-human animals capable of weaving the same conceptual richness that forms the fabric of human social interactions. Nevertheless, this richness is in an evolutionary continuum with capacities possessed by ancestors that we share with our near relatives. And for de Waal this actually extends beyond what we share with primates to other parts of Kingdom Animalia. His thoughts are best captured in his own words,
"I've argued that many of what philosophers call moral sentiments can be seen in other species. In chimpanzees and other animals, you see examples of sympathy, empathy, reciprocity, a willingness to follow social rules…” (quoted in Angier, 2001).
The obvious objection is that despite the fact we share certain social capacities with our near relatives, this should not distract from the fact that Homo sapiens retain other unique capacities, and it is these capacities that are required for morality. Sensible suggestions for unique capacities will include language ability, capacity for self-awareness and the ability for some sort of reasoned deliberation, though the extent to which these features are self-supporting will make specific claims about each difficult.
When pointing out these (potentially) unique human capacities we should be careful not construct a straw ape. I don’t believe there are many defending the view that the above abilities are not important to human morality. Even if we don’t have the right to say that it alone grants us the right to be called moral, language nevertheless turns the issue into a whole new ball game. I don’t think anyone is claiming chimpanzees have the same rich moral concepts that language grants us.
What is at stake then, is whether there is some capacity not found in any other animal, which is necessary for what we call morality, despite whatever social behaviours we share with them.
Responding to de Waal, Korsgaard argues that what our relatives seems to lack is some cognitive self-consciousness regarding the causes of one's own actions, Korsgaard attacks the assumption that “the morality of an action is a matter of content of the intention with which it is done” (2006:107) instead suggesting that what makes us moral beings is our “exercise of self-government” (112). This self-government amounts to the ability to be consciously aware of the reasons in which you intend to act, not merely as the objects of that act, but as reasons! To be aware of the object of one’s intended act one must not only be aware of the object as e.g. a desirable thing. Rather one must further be aware that you do desire that object. Humans are aware that they have grounds for acting, not merely of the grounds for which they act. This reason granting ability (112-113) allows humans to not only form beliefs about the intentions based on evidence but to be aware of the evidence and its connection to other states. They can deliberate, reconsider and alter. This autonomy makes us moral. Importantly Korsgaard stresses this in an entirely natural development and on a continuous scale of evolved intentionality. This continuity however, does not stop the fact that what is unique to humans is what makes us moral.
I do not disagree with Korsgaard over humanity’s (probably) unique capacity for self-awareness, and the unique conceptions this grants us. I do not deny that humans are uniquely motivated by deliberating on what we “ought” to do, and this in turn plays an enormous role in our moral lives. What I have some doubts about is the requirement that we find this ability in an animal before we can talk about their moral capacities full stop.
Responding in “Primates and Philosophers” Peter Singer also argues that similarities aside, non-humans animals lack a crucial component for morality. What makes morality morality, what makes one a being capable of moral thinking, is the ability to universalise, the ability to take your considerations and impartially generalise them. Other animals consider and abide by rules concerning their kin and in-group but “It is only when we make these general, impartial judgements that we can really begin to speak of moral approval and disapproval” (Singer, 2006: 144). Singer rightly points out that only we humans have the reasoning capacity to think abstractly in this way.
I worry that both Korsgaard and Singer set the requirements for morality too high, or make the mistake of not allowing morality to be flexible and evolutionarily continuous enough. I think I am naturally sceptical of the value of strict necessary and sufficient conditions for definitions concerning complex cognitive phenomena. I worry further that Korsgaard and Singer are too influenced by formal Western philosophical traditions. Perhaps the whole debate is fixed within a particular cultural paradigm. Do all peoples have the same monolithic conception of “morality”?
Whilst we can see Korsgaard’s requirements for morality stem from the respectable Kantian tradition, as Ober and Macedo point out, it is not so clear that we believe “self-government” is required in what we take as everyday moral acts (2006: xviii). Imagine when I perceive someone inflicting an unnecessary harm on another, I perceive it as bad and consequently interfere; do I need to be aware of my perception of the harm inflicted as a cause? Perhaps we could say “not always”, but what matters is that we are capable of such reflection. But I’m not sure this requirement of higher reflection , important though it is, suddenly boosts us into the hitherto unexplored realm of the moral- “morality” refers to something far to ambiguous and complex for that. As for Singer, though again I see the importance universalizability plays in our formal moral conceptions, I worry that much of what we regard as moral in our lives doesn’t actually fit the bill. I will leave this point to another discussion however, as it requires much greater attention. For now it is worth asking ourselves how much of our “everyday morality” boils down to reciprocity, empathy, conflict aversion and relatively straightforward social rules?
I'm hesitant to use the cliché, but the debate might boil down to “semantics”. Singer seems to define morality as requiring impartial universalizability. At the same time de Waal says, “Moral systems are inherently biased towards the in-group” implying that morality, by definition, need not be impartial. If we can’t reasonably agree on what morality consists of to begin with, it is going to be hard to say when and where we find it. As Ober and Macedo say, it will become a case of comparing apples and oranges (xix).
Darwin believed “the difference in mind between man and the higher animals, great as it is, certainly is one of degree and not of kind”, but added that it was humanity’s unique “intelligence” that produced conscience, “the supreme judge and monitor” (1871, online). Though our social faculties are essentially no different in kind, our unique cognitive capacities produce a novel development.
Perhaps then it is pragmatic to distinguish between the “proto-moral” capacities we find in other species, and the “human-moral” capacities distinguished by something like what Korsgaard or Singer point out; as long as this does not detract from the fact that one has its origins, at least in part, in the capacity for the other. Elsewhere de Waal says, “Non-human primates may not be exactly moral beings, but they do show...key components or 'prerequisites' of morality recognizable in social animals...reciprocity, empathy, sympathy, and community concern” (2000:3).
And that's probably enough for one post! There's clearly a lot more to be said on the issues raised here, and I hope to return to develop my thoughts on them within the near future.
Angier, N (2001). "Confessions of a Lonely Atheist". The New York Times Magazine. http://partners.nytimes.com/library/magazine/home/20010114mag-atheism.html. Retrieved 11th March 2011
Flack, J.C,. de Waal, F (2000) “ ‘Any animal whatever'. Darwinian building blocks of morality in monkeys and apes”. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 7, 1-2 pp. 1-29(29)
Korsgaard, C.M (2006) Morality and the Distinctiveness of Human Action in “Primates and Philosophers” Eds. Stephen Macedo, and Josiah Ober. Princeton University Press: Princeton
Singer, P (2006) Morality, Reason and the Rights of Animals in “Primates and Philosophers” Eds. Stephen Macedo, and Josiah Ober. Princeton University Press: Princeton
de Waal, F (1996) Good Natured: The Origins of Right and Wrong in Humans and Other Animals. Harvard University Press: Cambridge, MA
de Waal, F(2006) Morality Evolved: primate Social Instincts, Human morality, and the Rise and Fall of “Veneer Theory” in “Primates and Philosophers” Eds. Stephen Macedo, and Josiah Ober. Princeton University Press: Princeton
Warneken, F. (2006). Altruistic Helping in Human Infants and Young Chimpanzees Science, 311 (5765), 1301-1303 DOI: 10.1126/science.1121448
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