Memes as Metaphor

A couple of weeks ago I mentioned that memetics might still prove useful even if memes, strictly speaking, don't exist. Even if the unit of replication that Blackmore posits isn't real, the study of memes might still be tracking some feature of the world that is. Of course, if this turns out to be the case then we might not want to continue calling it memetics - or alternatively, we might want to adapt our definition of a meme.

In The Meme Machine, Blackmore spent a couple of chapters considering the possibility of morality evolving (either genetically or memetically), and it is this broad topic that concerns Richard Joyce in The Evolution of Morality. Given the complex relationship between culture and (genetic) evolution, and the recent popularity of memetic explanations of culture, I was surprised to find only a single, terse reference to memes in Joyce's book: a footnote explaining that his talk of cultural evolution "is not to be confused with 'meme theory'" (2006: 235, note 21).

Despite agreeing with Blackmore that "[t]here is nothing in the theory [of evolution] that says that the traits in question must be genetically encoded" (Joyce 2006: 42), as well as finding explanatory value in the idea that culture might evolve independently of genetics, Joyce keeps his distance from memetic explanations. His use of cultural evolution "leaves open the issue of whether cultural items satisfy the criteria for being considered replicators" (2006: 235). This is a fair point, but not one that should render any contribution from memetics completely worthless. A lot of what he has to say about the cultural evolution of morality meshes well with Blackmore's memetic explanation of altruism, although of course they place their emphasis differently (Joyce on genetic evolution, Blackmore on cultural). Nonetheless, the basic idea that culture might come to "harness" an innate compulsion to feel certain 'moral' emotions (such as guilt or empathy) is shared by both of them.

I think that the Dawkins-inspired 'memetic revolution' has hit upon a very powerful heuristic for investigating cultural evolution, but has also shot itself in the foot somewhat by trying to be too radical. Their emphasis on defining the meme as unit of replication akin to the gene has tended to undercut the seriousness with which some of their ideas might otherwise have been considered. This is unfortunate, as whilst the idea of cultural evolution per se isn't necessarily that radical, it could certainly do with some more focused study. Anthologies such as The Adapted Mind (Barkow, Cosmides, & Tooby, 1992) and volume two of The Innate Mind (Carruthers, Laurence, & Stich, 2007) certainly go some way towards doing this, but by and large they are still limited by the artificial dichotomy between (genetic) evolution and culture. Memetics could break this dichotomy, if only it dropped some of its reverence for the slightly implausible comparison between memes and genes. There's certainly room for the meme as a unit of replication, although it will be a much vaguer unit than the gene, one that is necessarily somewhat metaphorical.

• Barkow, J., Cosmides, L. & Tooby, J. 1992. The Adapted Mind. Oxford: OUP.
• Blackmore, S. 1999. The Meme Machine. Oxford: OUP. 
• Carruthers, P., Laurence, S. & Stich, S. 2007. Innate Mind, Vol. 2: Culture and Cognition. Oxford: OUP
• Joyce, R. 2006. The Evolution of Morality. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.