(by Jonny)
Consciousness is odd,
I'll give you that. I tend to favour what you might call a
deflationary account of Chalmers' “hard problem of consciousness”,
that is the so-called problem of explaining the relationship between
physical events like brain processes and the conscious experience of
the world, the phenomenal “quality” of experience. I tend to
favour the notion that the apparent incapability between a
description of physical processes a description of first person
“qualia” is only that, an apparent incapability. Given sufficient
conceptual models, and sufficient knowledge of the processes at work,
we will begin to see that consciousness is as an explicable natural
phenomena as any other. Like other supporters of a deflationary
account, I think we will explain away the hard problem by solving the
easy ones,problems like how we discriminate, integrate information,
report mental states etc.
Yet consciousness is
nonetheless odd. Whether we like it or not, the phenomena is so
special that has continued to persuade philosophers that it is is
unique among perhaps all other phenomena, beyond physical or
otherwise objective explanation. For this alone we have to give
consciousness the respect of being marvellously teasing.
One philosopher for
whom consciousness is especially mysterious is Colin McGinn. Via a
position ominously labled “new mysterianism”, McGinn famously
argues that consciousness may well be simply beyond our
understanding. Human beings just do not have the capacity to solve
the hard problem, the answers are beyond us.
 |
| Colin McGinn. Looking Mysterious. |
I've always had a
certain sympathy for this position. It has always struck me that, in
principle, McGinn could be right. Though we might be motivated by
different reason, I agree that it is possible that
an understanding of consciousness is beyond human understanding.
From my perspective, it seems to be right that there is a limit to
human brain power, and that there could be, in principle, phenomena
which to understand would take an amount of information processing
beyond at least our current limit.
Where I disagree with
this position is where it draws the line. It is tempting to say “we
might not be able to explain consciousness” and confuse it with “we
certainty cannot explain consciousness” and from there draw the
conclusion “there's not point trying to explain consciousness”. I
rather believe that this pessimistic line is too quick to jump the
gun. Whilst it could be that consciousness is beyond us, there
is no real reason to conclude it is in actual fact. I agree with
Dennett's tone when says about this sort of view, “...just
like Leibniz, they have offered nothing, really, in the way of
arguments for their pessimistic conclusions, beyond a compelling
image.” (2006:5).
 |
| Leibniz believed that when looking into our organic selves we would find only parts, like the machinery of a mill, and the mysteries of the mind would remain unexplained. |
New
Mysterianism does well to raise the possibility of human limitation
and our possible arrogance of thinking we may, as a matter of
principle, solve every theoretical problem. But it fails in lacking
the reflection that it could be
that we can. And that even if there are some unsolvable mysteries,
consciousness isn't looking to such a specimen. It looks again like
philosophers are too quick to grant consciousness a special status,
too quick to exaggerate it's near supernatural nature.
In
actual fact I believe we have come some way to explaining
consciousness, and long may it continue. I for one am optimistic
about the easy problems of the future.
Dennett,
D (2006) Sweet Dreams: Philosophical Obstacles to a Science of
Consciousness. MIT Press: Masachusetts
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